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Arms Races 
In the Third World: 
Argentina and Brazil 
PETER C. FREDERIKSEN 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School 
M ilitary expenditures have more than doubled in the past decade in Latin America, from $9.2 billion in 1973 to nearly $20 billion 
in 1983. 1 Concomitant with this large increase, there has been a grow-
ing interest among economists, political scientists, and other scholars 
(1) to explain the militariz.ation of the region as a whole, 2 and (2) to 
search for variables to explain levels of defense spending within individual 
countries. This latter thrust has focused on factors such as economic 
conditions, population, size of the country, rivalries, and arms buildup. 
The purpose of this article is to examine whether a significant part 
of Argentina's military budget over a 22-year span can be attributed to 
an arms race with Brazil. Multiple regression equations are estimated 
for the period 1961 to 1982 that take into account Brazil's military spend-
ing levels, changes in political regimes within Argentina, and also the 
availability of economic resources allocated to the government. In terms 
of the arms race between the two countries, our results indicate that the 
rivalry existed until some time in the mid-1970s. Since then, however, 
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its importance has faded, and other factors have become more impor-
tant determinants of defense spending in Argentina. 
There are several reasons why Argentina and Brazil have been chosen 
for this study. First, the two countries have long been recognized as rivals, 
a situation representing a classic arms race in the Third World. 3 Sec-
ond, the arms race is conducive to analysis since it involves only two 
players and thus is relatively "simple." Third, recent data published by 
the World Bank on budget allocations for all central government func-
tions from 1961 to 19824 permit an in-depth study of Argentina's mili-
tary expenditure patterns. Finally, a recent paper by Selcher has sug-
gested that Argentina and Brazil have gradually moved away from a 
relationship of "wary rivalry" toward one of "friendly competition."5 
If this is true, one would expect a given growth in Brazil's military budget 
to result in different reactions in Argentina's military spending habits, 
possibly leading to economic cooperation. Consequently, Argentine mili-
tary expenditure patterns will be scrutinized for the period as a whole 
to test for any general patterns of military spending and also for three 
subperiods (1961-72, 1961-75, and 1974-82) to coincide with both re-
gime changes in Argentina and increases in economic cooperation be-
tween the two countries. 
As Selcher noted, much of the early rivalry arose because Argen-
tina saw Brazil emerging as the leading nation in Latin America. 6 Fur-
ther, internal divisions and serious problems of economic development 
contributed to Argentina's feeling of inferiority. The rise of nationalism 
in the country in the early 1970s-combined with trade disputes, border 
problems, and regime changes, among other things-pushed Argentina 
into an arms race with Brazil. 
Although Selcher's purpose was to forecast the direction and qual-
ity of Brazilian and Argentine relationships for the late 1980s, he cited 
many specific cases of recent close cooperation between the two na-
tions. For instance, 
•In 1976, Oscar Camilion was chosen as ambassador to Brazil; 
•In 1979, the Itaipu Dam settlement occurred; 
•In 1982, "Latinamericaniz.ation" (or introspection) of foreign policy 
took place as a result of the Malvinas crisis; and 
•In 1983, the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile was settled. 7 
Other factors that played a rol~ included the general demilitarization of 
the country after 1980, the Foreign Ministry's stronger role in policy, 
domestic political liberalization, and a more friendly posture toward all 
neighboring states. 
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Determinants of Military Spending 
There are many reasons why a country spends for defense. Hill has 
suggested that arms races, military alliances, status and status discrepan-
cies in international systems, military aid, and the size of the country 
are a few of the major factors. 8 Westing has pointed to positive corre-
lations between defense expenditures and factors such as population, 
land area, and gross national product. 9 For the United States, Griffin 
et al. has suggested that "military outlays (as a percentage of GNP) do 
appear to be employed as a counter-cyclical fiscal instrument by the 
state." 10 
Canadian defense expenditures have been examined by Treddenick. 
He concluded that military spending "may be significantly influenced 
by domestic economic imperatives which are independent of any secu-
rity considerations." 11 Maizels and Nissanke have suggested that a 
country's political framework, level of military activity, and economic 
linkages will all influence defense outlays; 12 the relative importance of 
each factor will be determined by the state's national, regional, and global 
conflicts. After studying defense spending in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, Harris concluded that "economic 
forces do exert at least a moderate influence on defense expenditure." 13 
In their study of Latin American military expenditure patterns, 
O'Leary and Coplin have suggested seven factors that influence defense 
spending: economic conditions in the country, the role of the armed ser-
vices in nonmilitary affairs, internal security needs, reactions to arms 
purchases by neighbors, budget allocations of service branches in rival 
states, internal political support, and the age and condition of existing 
military equipment. 14 While admitting the difficulty in quantifying 
many of the measures, they felt that gross domestic product was an ac-
curate measure of a state's economic condition. The military's role in 
nonmilitary affairs was quantified by the use of a dummy variable, and 
an index was developed for internal defense needs based on the number 
of riots, deaths from domestic violence, and political protests. A Mar-
kov chain process was used to test whether arms purchases by one country 
"led to a reaction by another nation to increase its acquisitions." 15 A 
similar technique was used to examine whether budget allocations of 
service branches in rival states affected defense allocations within any 
one country. (The final two factors were not quantified.) 
O'Leary and Coplin failed to observe any strong relationship be-
tween military spending levels and such components as GDP, the non-
military role of the armed forces, the need for a security force, or domestic 
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violence levels. On the other hand, they did observe some evidence of 
arms races in certain Latin American countries, especially where they 
involved certain sophisticated weapons. Further, budget levels of rival 
service branches acted as a sort of "reference point" for budgets in other 
countries. 
In an earlier paper we tested for the impact of economic variables 
in determining military spending levels in 10 Latin American coun-
tries. 16 Unlike the findings here, we found that economic variables 
(such as GDP, government revenue, or government expenditures) were 
correlated with levels of defense spending. In addition, the level of de-
fense spending in the previous year was a good predictor of that for the 
next year. While there appears to be no generalized relationship across 
Latin American countries, economic variables should not be dismissed 
when trying to explain military expenditure patterns. 
Building on these earlier works, the model presented below describes 
Argentina's military spending levels between 1961and1982, taking into 
account Brazil's military expenditure levels to test for an arms race. The 
model also incorporates regime changes and general resource alloca-
tions to the government sector. 
The Model and Empirical Results 
As noted, Argentina was selected for study since, from many reports, 
it has been involved in an arms,race with Brazil, and also since it seems 
that the race has now abated. The model used to test for the impact of 
Brazil's spending patterns on Argentina's military spending levels is as 
follows: 
ARGMILX = f (BRAZMILX, GEY, DUMP), 
where ARGMILX and BRAZMILX represent Argentina's and Brazil's 
military spending levels, respectively, and where GEY is a ratio of govern-
ment expenditures to GDP, reflecting the level of resources available 
to the government for all uses. The effect of different political regimes 
in Argentina17 is represented by a dummy variable, DUME 
Since 1961 there have been four different regimes: two civilian ones 
in 1961-65 and 1973-75 and two military ones in 1966-72 and 1976-82 . 
• 
A simple civilian/military dichotomy is inappropriate because there is 
little evidence to suggest all civilian and military regimes behave alike. 
The dummy variable scheme used in this model follows Grindle18 and 
our earlier work, 19 in which both the first civilian and military regimes 
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were assigned a value of 1 since only minor differences appeared be-
tween them. The second civilian regime (the Peronists) was assigned 
a value of zero; it was least likely to reduce other expenditures as de-
fense increased. The second military regime (the budget-authoritarians) 
was assigned a value of 2. 
The inclusion of DUMF in the model tests for a change in Argen-
tina's military expenditures for an given level of GEY as the regimes 
change-that is, it tests for a significant change in the intercept. Alter-
natively, as the regimes change, significant alterations in defense spending 
could occur with changes in GEY-that is, the marginal propensity to 
spend on military programs is altered. To test for this effect, an addi-
tional dummy variable DUMFX (DUMF times GEY) is included in the 
model. 
The coefficient of BRAZMILX is hypothesized to be positive if an 
arms race exists. The sign of the coefficient for GEY is also expected 
to be positive; as the nation's output expands, so will government ex-
penditures. The signs of the coefficients for the dummy variables will 
be positive if military regimes spend more on defense than do their ci-
vilian counterparts. 
Table 1 
Estimated Regression Equations, 
Argentine Military Expenditure., 1961-82 
Independent Variables 
Period BRAZMILX GEY DUMF DUMFX 
1961-82 (-0.67) (-1.11) 
( 0.96) (-0.75) (2.38)*. 
( 1.01) (-1.21) (2.17)** 
1961-72 3.14)*. 
4.55)* •• 6.22)* •• 
4.19)* •• 5.22)* •• (0.02) 
1961-75 3.56)* •• (5.99)* •• 
4.37)* •• 3.83)* •• (9.13)* •• 
5.11)* •• 3.77)* •• (12.09) ••• 
1974-82 ( -1.68) ( -2.06)* 
(-2.14)* (-2.52)* (2.65)* 
(-2.13)* (-2.72)* (2.55)* 
R2 F DW 
.01 0.71 1.17 
.28 1.98 1.37 
.52 9.88 1.70 
.95 75.58 2.43 
.95 37.73 2.43 
.77 16.65 1.72 
.93 38.41 2.16 
.96 68.34 2.31 
.42 2.16 2.28 
.66 2.02 2.33 
Notes: I-statistics in parentheses; * indicates statistical significance of the coefficient 
at the 90 percent level, ** at the 95 percent level, and *** at the 99 percent 
level. 
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The results, which appear in table 1, 20 have been reported for four 
periods-the entire time span (1961-82), the first military and civilian 
regimes (1961-72), the Peronists (1961-75), and, finally, 1974-82-to test 
for the impact of increased cooperation between the two countries. The 
results for the whole period suggest no arms race existed between 
Argentina and Brazil since the estimated coefficients are not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for DUMF 
and DUMFX are positive and statistically significant, suggesting political 
change was the main force behind changes in Argentina's military, 
spending levels. //~ 
A different picture emerges when one examines the suppenc;ds. The 
arms race between Argentina and Brazil is apparen,t..d'Urlng the period 
1961-72. The coefficients ofBRAZMILX in ea5hform of the model are 
positive and statistically significant. In a,ddition, as the government 
expenditures to GDP ratio (GEY) in,c;;.reased, there was a significant 
increase in military spending in Argintina. Although a military regime 
came into power in 1966, it _avfears that budget priorities remained 
unaltered-the coefficient fo{DUMF is statistically insignificant in this 
period. Fifty-two percent of the variability in Argentina's military 
spending can be explained by changes in Brazil's military budget. If GEY 
is included, the proportion rises to 95 percent. 
If the period is extended to include the Peronists (1961-75), the results 
are broadly similar to those just reported. However, the regime change 
also contributed to changes in military spending. The R2 value is more 
than 90 percent with the inclusion of BRAZMILX, GEY, and DUMF 
or DUMFX. 
As noted, the relationship between the two countries gradually 
changed in the mid-1970s from one of rivalry to one of cooperation and 
exchanges between them. To examine whether this had any effect on 
military spending in Argentina, equations were re-estimated for the period 
1974-82. The results support Selcher's hypothesis that the arms race 
had gradually abated between the two countries. Although the sign of 
the estimated coefficient for BRAZMILX is negative, only tentative 
conclusions can be drawn from the data, given the small time period 
under consideration. There is some evidence that there was a period 
of general demilitarization since the estimated coefficient for GEY was 
negative: as government expenditures grew relative to GDP, a smaller 
part was allocated to defense. Once again, this tends to support Selcher's 
observations. On the other hand, it appears that any impetus to increase 
the military's share of Argentina's resources originated from changes 
in the regime. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Earlier studies have focused on the role that economic factors and 
regime changes play in determining military expenditure levels in Latin 
America and, in particular, Argentina. This paper has extended these 
analyses by testing to see whether (1) an arms race existed between 
Argentina and Brazil during the 1960s and early 1970s, and (2) this race 
had diminished after relations between the two countries improved starting 
in the mid-1970s. Our results confirm that an arms race did exist between 
Argentina and Brazil during the time in question; additionally, they 
suggest that such an arms race can go on for long periods of time and 
that variations in military budgets from year to year can be explained 
by an arms-race model. 
Based on this case study for Argentina and Brazil, it seems that 
increases in economic cooperation and exchanges between rivals can 
be an extremely powerful impetus to .halt an arms race. In the face of 
an existing arms race, little can be done to stop the escalation except 
to increase cooperation and mutual understanding between the involved 
countries. Our results suggest also that political priorities in Argentina 
have become more important in determining military spending levels 
than in reacting to defense budgets in Brazil. A fruitful area for future 
research might be to test for other arms races both within and outside 
Latin America. Another area might be a further disaggregation to test 
whether service branches emulate one another in rival situations. 
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